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Abstract 
Ricardo essentially adhered to the logic of trade that Smith formulated in the Wealth of 
Nations. The contrary notion that they had opposing logics of trade is the result of an 
inaccurate interpretation of Ricardo’s numerical demonstration of the comparative-advantage 
proposition in chapter seven of the Principles. A deeper understanding of this numerical 
demonstration also leads to a partial refutation of the familiar contraposition between the 
comparative-advantage proposition and the absolute cost advantage theory of trade. 
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Introduction 
The conventional view serves to protect us from the painful job of thinking. 
John Kenneth Galbraith 
Throughout the economic literature one can find the ubiquitous contraposition 
between Ricardo’s comparative-advantage proposition and the absolute cost advantage theory of 
trade. The later is usually attributed to Smith. So many prestigious scholars have validated this 
contraposition that one is naturally compelled to accept it without hesitation. A few scholars 
have even gone a step further by affirming that Smith and Ricardo had distinct and opposing 
logics of trade.1 
Buchanan & Yoon (2002) describe the term “logic of trade” as the logical arguments 
that influence an economist’s thinking on open markets and free trade by creating a basic 
mind-set about the origins and importance of exchange. This basic mind-set functions as a 
sort of lens through which the current process of economic globalization is perceived and 
judged. By influencing public attitudes towards economic globalization, the predominant 
logic of trade also determines to an important extent the political decisions regarding the 
nature and scope of this process. 
The notion that Smith and Ricardo had opposing logics of trade is the inevitable 
consequence of the inaccurate interpretation of the famous numerical demonstration of the 
comparative-advantage proposition in chapter seven of the Principles. As shown in a previous 
paper (Morales, 2011), Sraffa’s (1930) and Ruffin’s (2002) correct interpretation of Ricardo’s 
four numbers clears the way for a better understanding of the original purpose and main 
                                                
1 See, for example, Myint (1977) and Buchanan & Yoon (2002). Their notion about the two distinct 
and opposing logics of trade has been recently echoed by economist Russ Roberts in his popular 
podcast EconTalk (http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2010/02/roberts_on_smit.html). This may lead 
to a greater divulgence of the notion among current economic students, which are presumably the 
largest group of subscribers to Roberts’ podcast. 
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propositions of this numerical example. Building on these insights, it is possible to refute the 
notion about the opposing logics of trade. As will be shown later on, Ricardo’s two novel and 
intertwined propositions in the famous numerical example — the non-appliance of the labor 
theory of value in international exchanges and the comparative-advantage insight — do not 
constitute a departure from the Smithean logic of trade. The main purpose and contribution 
of this paper is to argue that Ricardo in fact adhered to the logic of trade that Smith outlined 
in the Wealth of Nations. Furthermore, the paper will also question the general validity of the 
familiar contraposition between absolute and comparative cost advantage. 
The Two Logics of Trade 
In the early days of economics as an independent scientific discipline, its practitioners 
relied mostly upon the logic of trade that Smith outlined in the Wealth of Nations for praising 
the benefits of free trade. According to the Smithean logic of trade, the division of labor plays 
a pivot role in increasing the wealth of individuals as well as national economies. Individual 
producers specialize and trade with each other within and between national borders because 
in that way they become more productive and can obtain a greater amount of commodities 
and services for consumption. Concentrating the individual productive effort on a narrow 
range of goods — or even a single type of commodity and service — in the vast majority of 
cases pays off, since trading is often a more efficient mean of procuring goods for 
consumption than self-production, or to put it differently, the indirect method of production 
— trading — in many cases requires less amount of labor than the direct method of 
production.  
According to the Smithean logic of trade, free trade would make a crucial contribution 
to the purpose of increasing the wealth of individuals and nations to the utmost, since the 
extension of the market beyond national borders encourages the division of labor and spurs 
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labor productivity at home. Smith intertwines his logic of trade so effectively with the quest 
for economic growth and development that Myint (1977) refers to it as Smith’s productivity 
theory of trade. 
Today’s predominant logic of trade, however, is not the one outlined above, but an 
alternative logic of trade commonly attributed to Ricardo. The so-called Ricardian logic of 
trade locates the origins of exchange in the differences among individuals or countries in 
terms of their capacities to produce separate final goods. According to this alternative logic, 
trade emerges because individuals or countries have different comparative advantages in 
producing different goods. If such differences exist, specialization will always prove to be 
mutually beneficial. If one assumes, on the contrary, that individuals or countries are identical 
in both their preferences and respective capacities to produce these final goods, then trade 
among them could not take place because it would not yield any benefits (Buchanan & Yoon, 
2002, p. 400). 
As Buchanan & Yoon point out, there is indeed a subtle reversal of the logical sequence 
between the two logics of trade. According to the Smithean logic of trade, exchange emerges 
because of the inherent advantages of specialization. The observed differences among trading 
partners are the consequence of their respective specialization — not the point of departure. 
As Smith famously wrote in the Wealth of Nations, the differences between a philosopher and a 
street porter may be small prior to their individual commitment to their respective profession. 
In the logic of trade currently attributed to Ricardo, on the contrary, specialization and 
subsequent trade can only emerge because of inherent and preexisting differences among 
potential trading partners. 
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Ricardo’s New Law of International Specialization? 
When Myint (1977) and later Buchanan & Yoon (2002) highlighted the differences 
between the Smithean and the Ricardian logic of trade, they defined the later based on the 
Ricardian trade model of contemporary economic textbooks. They were assuming, like many 
others, that the so-called Ricardian model was essentially equivalent to what Ricardo had 
originally written in the Principles. As a previous paper has shown (Morales, 2010), though, 
there are actually significant differences and incompatibilities between the original numerical 
example in the Principles and the Ricardian model of economic textbooks. Consequently, one 
cannot automatically attribute the assumptions and implications of the textbook trade model 
to Ricardo. Since this automatic attribution is difficult to avoid when the textbook trade 
model is denominated as “Ricardian model”, I will continue the practice from the previous 
paper of referring to the textbook trade model as the Constant-Unitary-Labor-Costs (CULC) 
trade model. 
Undoubtedly, one of the main legacies of the CULC trade model has been the 
widespread notion that Ricardo highlighted in the famous numerical example a new principle 
or law for international specialization known as comparative advantage. Despite investing 
considerable time and effort, however, I have not been able to find in the Principles or any 
other document written by Ricardo the slightest evidence for such an interpretation. What he 
actually intended to illustrate with the famous four numbers was the new proposition that the 
labor theory of value does not regulate the relative value of commodities in international 
trade when the factors of production are immobile between countries. He then mentioned 
the associated corollary regarding comparative advantage, i.e. that a country might import a 
certain amount of a commodity although it can produce these commodities internally with 
less amount of labor than the exporting country (Morales, 2011). 
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These two new propositions are rightfully considered as significant contributions of 
Ricardo to the classical theory of international trade. First and foremost, they prove the 
counterintuitive notion that a country may export commodities to another country even if it 
were less productive than the importing country in producing these commodities, extending 
the cases in which international specialization is considered to be profitable for the 
participating countries. They also explain why higher real labor costs in developing countries 
do not command higher commodity prices in international markets. These issues are 
passionately contested in the contemporary debate about economic globalization. 
Notwithstanding the importance of Ricardo’s new propositions, they do not constitute 
— nor were they ever meant to be —, a new principle or law for international specialization. 
On the contrary, Ricardo builds up his ingenious yet simple numerical demonstration of the 
two propositions on the classical rule of specialization, the very same rule Smith deployed 
throughout the Wealth of Nations in order to highlight the advantages of trade between closed 
neighbors as well as people living in distant cities, regions and countries. 
The classical rule of specialization — which other scholars call the gains-from-trade 
proposition — is an essential part of Smith’s productivity theory of trade. Applied to international 
exchanges this rule stipulates that it is beneficial for a country to import commodities 
whenever it can obtain them in exchange for exports whose production entails less real cost 
compared to the home-production of the same amount of the imported commodities.2 
The famous numerical example of chapter seven is not the only reference to the 
classical rule of specialization in the Principles. On the contrary, Ricardo applies the rule in 
other passages of his book as well. For example, he states in chapter nine: 
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“The motive which determines us to import a commodity, is the discovery of its relative 
cheapness abroad: it is the comparison of its price abroad with its price at home. If a 
country exports hats, and imports cloth, it does so because it can obtain more cloth by 
making hats, and exchanging them for cloth, than if it made the cloth itself” (Vol. I, p. 
170).3 
Ricardo’s recurrent references to the classical rule of specialization throughout the 
Principles prove that he did not have any alternative rule for international specialization in 
mind. But how is it possible then, one may ask, that the contrary notion could remain 
virtually unchallenged for so many years? 
Several factors may have contributed to create and sustain the myth that Ricardo 
formulated an alternative law or principle for international specialization. First, generations of 
economists have learned the comparative-advantage proposition mainly from the CULC 
trade model as explained in very influential economic textbooks rather than directly from the 
Principles. Therefore, it has been very difficult for them to notice that the textbook trade 
model departs rather significantly from what is actually written in the primary source. Second, 
Ricardo himself may have inadvertently contributed to the erroneous notion by conceiving 
the Principles mainly as a compilation of propositions and insights that were either new or 
opposed to established propositions of political economy. Since Smith was the highest 
authority of political economy back then, such a general plan for the Principles artificially 
emphasizes the differences and minimizes the level of agreement with respect to Smith. 
Ricardo himself was well aware of this danger, as the following paragraph from the preface of 
the Principles clearly proves: 
                                                                                                                                             
2 Although Smith was not the original author of the classical rule of specialization, he might very well 
be considered as its main popularizer. The classical rule of specialization can be traced back to the 
anonymous pamphlet Considerations on the East-India Trade of 1701, which is now believed to have been 
written by English lawyer and journalist Henry Martyn. For Martyn’s likely authorship, see MacLeod 
(1983). 
3 For other references to the classical rule of specialization in the Principles, see Ricardo (Vol. I, p. 264, 
p. 295 and p. 319). Throughout this paper, all references to Ricardo’s writings are from The Works and 
Correspondence of David Ricardo, Volume I to XI, 2004, edited by Piero Sraffa. I will refer to them usually 
by indicating the volume and page numbers only. 
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“The writer, in combating received opinions, has found it necessary to advert more 
particularly to those passages in the writings of Adam Smith from which he sees reason 
to differ; but he hopes it will not, on that account, be suspected that he does not, in 
common with all those who acknowledge the importance of the science of Political 
Economy, participate in the admiration which the profound work of this celebrated 
author so justly excites” (Vol. I, p. 6).  
Notwithstanding his awareness about the potential risk, Ricardo decided to proceed 
with this general plan for the Principles because of a personal virtue rarely seen in other 
famous scientists: humility. Ricardo was indeed a very humble and unpretentious man that 
had great self-doubts about his writing skills.4 Because of his self-diagnosed shortcoming, 
Ricardo preferred to leave the major task of presenting a complete view of his ideas on 
political economy perhaps for a future book. Unfortunately, Ricardo died six years after the 
publication of the Principles, at the early age of fifty-one. Contrary to the original purpose, the 
Principles became the main source of his thoughts on political economy in general and 
international trade in particular.  
These biographical facts are highly relevant for an accurate interpretation of the main 
propositions in the Principles. These propositions cannot be correctly interpreted without 
taking into close consideration the relevant passages of the Wealth of Nations. Furthermore, 
one can generally presume that Ricardo agreed with those Smithean propositions which are 
not explicitly criticized and rejected in the Principles, at least until some scholar offers a 
convincing prove that this general presumption does not apply to a particular proposition. 
Perhaps the main reason for the popularity of the erroneous notion that Ricardo 
formulated an alternative rule of specialization in international trade has to do with the fact 
that this notion is particularly convenient for the mainstream neoclassical paradigm. The next 
section is dedicated to explain this affirmation. 
                                                
4 This becomes clear when reading the correspondence between him and his dear friend James Mill. 
See, in particular, Ricardo’s letter to James Mill (Vol. VII, p. 112) on December 20th, 1816, 
responding to Mill’s letter of December 16th (Vol. VII, p. 106). 
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The Origin of the Constant-Labor-Costs Assumption 
For many years the constant-labor-costs assumption has functioned as a sort of 
separating wall between the international trade theories of Smith and Ricardo. This 
prominent assumption of the CULC trade model stipulates that the amount of labor needed 
for producing a single unit of a commodity or service do not vary with the amount of 
commodities or services produced. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the 
constant-labor-costs assumption was originally incorporated to mainstream economic 
thought by neoclassical economists who were trying to solve the so-called imputation problem in 
order to incorporate a theory of distribution to their general theory of prices. They solved it 
by making the unrealistic assumption that the market economy is characterized by constant 
returns to scale, so that production functions are everywhere “linear and homogeneous” 
(Buchanan & Yoon, 2002, pp. 402-403).  
The neoclassical assumption of constant returns to scale is of course incompatible with 
Smith’s productivity theory of trade, since the later stipulates that an ever-increasing amount of 
commodities and services is produced with less amount of labor, because the division of 
labor and the invention and deployment of sophisticated machinery spurs labor productivity. 
On the other hand, there is no inherent conflict between the CULC trade model and the 
neoclassical constraint of constant returns. No wonder that neoclassical economists adopted 
what they believed to be the Ricardian logic of trade as their basic explanation for the benefits 
of international trade before returning partially and somewhat reluctantly to the Smithean 
logic of trade with the formulation of new trade models featuring increasing returns to scale 
and imperfect competition since the 1980s. 
As I have affirmed before, though, one cannot automatically attribute the assumptions 
and implications of the CULC trade model to Ricardo. The accurate interpretation of the 
numerical example in the Principles proves beyond doubt that he did not assume that the 
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respective labor costs of the amounts of cloth and wine traded remain constant. Since the 
constant-labor-costs assumption has no implicit or explicit foothold whatsoever in Ricardo’s 
international trade theory, one cannot label the logic of trade associated with this assumption 
as the Ricardian logic of trade. 
As further evidence that Ricardo did not conceive any alternative logic of trade, one can 
refer to a passage in the Principles were he actually paraphrases the Smithean logic of trade. He 
states: 
“The labour of a million of men in manufactures, will always produce the same value, 
but will not always produce the same riches. By the invention of machinery, by 
improvements in skill, by a better division of labour, or by the discovery of new markets, 
where more advantageous exchanges may be made, a million of men may produce 
double, or treble the amount of riches, of “necessaries, conveniences, and amusements,” 
in one state of society, that they could produce in another, but they will not on that 
account add any thing to value; for every thing rises or falls in value, in proportion to the 
facility or difficulty of producing it, or, in other words, in proportion to the quantity of 
labour employed on its production” (Vol. I, p. 273). 
In the above paragraph Ricardo explicitly embraces Smith’s productivity theory of trade 
while at the same time rejecting the vent-for-surplus theory. Therefore, this quote also proves 
that Ricardo’s well-known rejection of the later should not be considered as a departure from 
the logic of trade that Smith outlined in the Wealth of Nations. 
Of course some may think that a single passage of the Principles is an insufficient proof 
for concluding that Ricardo adhered to Smith’s productivity theory of trade. After all, a similar 
explicit endorsement cannot be found elsewhere in that book. One has to take into 
consideration, however, that Ricardo conceived the Principles first and foremost as a 
compilation of propositions and insights that were either new or opposed to already 
established propositions of political economy. Thus, a lengthy exposition about a Smithean 
proposition he agreed with would have run against the general plan of the Principles. 
It is therefore safe to assume that the two main exponents of classical political economy 
had a common approach for explaining the benefits of trade and specialization, based on 
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Smith’s productivity theory of trade. This common approach can be labeled as the classical logic of 
trade. This means that what hitherto has been known as the Ricardian logic of trade should be 
relabeled as the neoclassical logic of trade, in order to use a denomination that reflects more 
accurately the true origin of this logic of trade. Therefore, the contraposition of the two logics 
of trade made by Myint (1977) and Buchanan & Yoon (2002) can be considered as 
substantially correct if it is relabeled as the contraposition between the classical and the 
neoclassical logic of trade. 
Absolute vs. Comparative Advantage? 
Let us turn now to a critical review of the widespread contraposition between Ricardo’s 
comparative advantage and Smith’s absolute cost advantage theory of trade, starting with a 
proper definition of the later. Since Smith is usually portrayed as the author and main 
supporter of the absolute cost advantage theory of trade, one is naturally tempted to search in 
the Wealth of Nations for a definition and vigorous exposition of this theory. Surprisingly, I 
could not find there a plain reference to the absolute cost advantage theory of trade. Those 
passages from the Wealth of Nations that are commonly brought up as proofs for Smith’s 
alleged adherence to this theory — mostly the two adjacent paragraphs IV.ii.11 and IV.ii.12, 
pp. 456-457 — are in fact about the classical rule of specialization rather than the absolute 
cost advantage theory of trade. Therefore, I agree with Ruffin’s assessment that the notion of 
Smith as the author and main advocate of this theory lacks concrete evidence (Ruffin, 2005, 
p. 715). 
One has to turn to other authors then for a suitable definition of the absolute cost 
advantage theory of trade. According to Ruffin (2005, p. 714), for example, the absolute 
advantage theory of trade stipulates that “it is necessary for a country to have a productivity advantage 
over other countries in order to profitably export.” Bloomfield defines this theory in slightly different 
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terms: “Countries tend to export those goods that can be produced at lower costs at home than abroad and to 
import those goods that can be produced at lower costs abroad than at home or that cannot be produced at 
home at all. And it was implied or explicitly stated that under free trade commodities would in fact be 
produced in countries where their absolute costs were lowest” (Bloomfield, 1989, p. 621). 
As a meticulous reader might notice, these two definitions of the absolute advantage 
theory of trade are not equivalent, since lower costs do not necessarily imply a productivity 
advantage and vice versa. If one defines the absolute advantage theory of trade according to 
Ruffin, then it is certainly incompatible with the comparative-advantage proposition. If one 
follows Bloomfield’s definition, however, the incompatibility is less stringent, since it depends 
on whether he is referring to real or nominal costs. 
The above distinction between real and nominal costs is indeed crucial, since Ricardo’s 
proposition about the non-appliance of the labor theory of value in international exchanges 
when the factors of production are immobile between countries, dismisses the previously 
assumed correspondence between real and nominal costs in international trade. A producer in 
one country may very well have higher real costs and, at the same time, lower nominal costs 
than a producer in another country when the law of value does not regulate the relative value 
of commodities in international exchanges. Just take the example of Chinese manufacturers in 
today’s economy: compared to their competitors in the developed economies, the Chinese 
manufacturers usually need more laborers — i.e. they have higher real labor costs — in order 
to produce the commodities currently exported to Europe and North America. Nevertheless, 
the Chinese manufacturers still manage to undercut the nominal costs of their European and 
North American competitors, mainly because of the low nominal salaries in China. 
Thus, the popular notion that the comparative-advantage proposition is incompatible 
with the absolute cost advantage theory of trade in only valid for the case in which absolute 
cost advantage is defined in terms of real costs, for example less amount of labor time. If by 
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absolute cost advantage, on the contrary, one merely means a nominal cost advantage, then 
this would not contradict the comparative-advantage proposition at all, since a foreign 
manufacturer always has to have a nominal cost (and price) advantage — or an advantage in 
terms of product quality — over the national manufacturers in order to export commodities 
to another country; otherwise, why would someone import a dearer commodity from abroad? 
Ricardo had the same view on this subject, since he wrote: “The motive which determines us to 
import a commodity, is the discovery of its relative cheapness abroad: it is the comparison of its price abroad 
with its price at home” (Vol. I, p. 170). 
Reassessment of Smith’s Contributions to International Trade Theory 
This partial compatibility between Ricardo’s comparative advantage and the absolute 
cost advantage theory of trade, together with the lack of evidence in the Wealth of Nations for 
Smith’s presumed authorship of the later, leads to a significant reassessment of Smith’s and 
Ricardo’s contributions to international trade theory. Until now many prestigious economists 
and historians have judged the contributions to international trade theory of these two 
masterminds of classical political economy primarily through the spectacles of the CULC 
trade model. Not surprisingly, this questionable practice has led in most cases to a negative 
assessment, often blaming Smith for his failure to discover the comparative-advantage 
proposition, and Ricardo for his allegedly defective demonstration of this proposition. The 
accurate interpretation of the numerical example in the Principles does not only refute any past 
criticism towards Ricardo’s demonstration of comparative advantage, but also opens the way 
for a more accurate and just appreciation of Smith’s contributions to international trade 
theory. 
Smith has been underrated as an international trade theorist in the contemporary 
economic literature because his productivity theory of trade is incompatible with the neoclassical 
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notion of comparative advantage. Ricardo’s own formulation of the comparative-advantage 
proposition, however, does neither contradict nor invalidate Smith’s productivity theory of trade. 
On the contrary, the accurate interpretation of the numerical example of the Principles 
confirms Viner’s assessment that the comparative-advantage proposition is indeed an 
implication of the classical rule of specialization, although a very important one.5 In this 
sense, the comparative-advantage proposition can be seen as a valuable addition rather than a 
point of disruption with respect to Smith’s international trade theory. 
As has been pointed out by other scholars, Smith clearly anticipated the main 
propositions of today’s New Trade and New Growth theories (Kibritcioglu, 2002). Any 
meticulous reader of the Wealth of Nations would hardly find anything new or particularly 
innovative in these two currently fashionable economic theories. The recent renaissance of 
Smith’s insights in contemporary economic thought can be seen as the ultimate proof for the 
continued relevance of his main propositions on international trade and economic growth. It 
is therefore wrong to judge Smith’s stature as an international trade theorist exclusively by the 
fact that he did not discover the comparative-advantage proposition. Myint indicates a better 
way for judging Smith’s contributions: “A true measure of his work cannot be obtained until we judge 
him by the insights which his approach can still offer to the unsettled questions of the interrelationship of 
international trade and economic development, particularly in the setting of the underdeveloped countries” 
(Myint, 1977, p. 232). In that sense, Smith remains the foremost scholar on the subject of 
international trade and economic growth. 
                                                
5 Viner (1937, p. 440) wrote: “The doctrine of comparative costs is, indeed, but a statement of some of the 
implications of this rule, and adds nothing to it as a guide for policy.” And few paragraphs later: “This explicit 
statement that imports could be profitable even though the commodity imported could be produced at less cost at home 
than abroad was, it seems to me, the sole addition of consequence which the doctrine of comparative costs made to the 
eighteenth-century rule. Its chief service was to correct the previously prevalent error that under free trade all commodities 
would necessarily tend to be produced in the locations where their real costs of production were lowest” (Viner, 1937, p. 
441). 
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Strengthening the Case for Free Trade 
The reconciliation of Ricardo’s numerical demonstration of comparative advantage 
with Smith’s productivity theory of trade has important consequences for contemporary 
international trade theory. It may contribute to the reinstatement of the classical logic of trade 
as the preeminent explanation regarding the emergence and benefits of trade in contemporary 
economic thought.  
A crucial advantage of the classical logic of trade over the neoclassical one is that the 
former offers a unified analysis of foreign trade and the domestic economy, oriented towards 
the problem of long-run economic growth (Myint 1977, p. 246). In classical political economy 
there are indeed no inherent differences in the underlying principles and logics of trade 
between domestic and foreign trade. That does not mean, however, that classical political 
economists ignore the existence of institutional differences between domestic and 
international trade like, for example, different national currencies, sanitary and custom 
regulations or other types of administrative rules on cross-border trade. Ricardo in particular 
is certainly aware of the differences in the degrees of factor mobility within and between 
countries, and the resulting implications for his labor theory of value. Notwithstanding the 
importance of these differences between domestic and foreign trade, they do not modify the 
underlying logic of trade. 
In terms of practical impact, a future preeminence of the classical case for free trade 
and its underlying logic of trade over the currently predominant neoclassical case would bear 
important implications for the contemporary political debate on free trade and economic 
globalization. As some authors have pointed out6, the classical logic of trade lends to 
universal support for extending the division of labor and specialization beyond political 
borders, since such an international extension of the market would boost labor productivity at 
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home. Moreover, the case for free trade based on the classical logic of trade does not rely on 
any unrealistic assumptions like perfect competition and constant return to scale associated 
with the general economic equilibrium paradigm. The critics of free trade have repeatedly 
pointed to these unrealistic assumptions as a proof for the inherent weakness of the current 
mainstream neoclassical case for free trade. This critique does not apply to the classical case 
for free trade. 
Perhaps the most important advantage of the classical over the neoclassical case for 
free trade is the fact that the former explicitly recognizes the potential short-term costs of 
trade liberalization for specific groups of people. Some national producers may indeed come 
under increased pressure from more innovative and efficient foreign competitors. As a result 
of the technical progress unleashed by free trade, some workers may loose their current 
employment. The recognition of these and other probable economic costs for specific groups 
do not harm the case for free trade, but ultimately strengthen it. It allows policy makers to 
adopt the proper remedies in order to hamper the negative impact of trade liberalization on 
these vulnerable groups, resulting in a more human and effective process of implementation 
of the free-trade principle. 
Conclusions 
Ricardo adhered to Smith’s productivity theory of trade. In particular, he agreed with Smith’s 
assessment in the Wealth of Nations regarding the importance of the international division of 
labor and specialization for increasing labor productivity and the amount of commodities 
available for consumption at home. 
The erroneous notion that Ricardo and Smith had opposing logics of trade has been 
created by the so-called Ricardian trade model of contemporary economic textbooks, which 
                                                                                                                                             
6 See, for example, Buchanan & Yoon (2002). 
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has been mistakenly taken as an accurate rational reconstruction of Ricardo’s original 
numerical example in the Principles. The textbook trade model is also responsible for the 
erroneous notion that Ricardo proposed a new law of international specialization called 
comparative advantage. An accurate understanding of the numerical example in the Principles 
proves beyond doubt that Ricardo relied upon the same rule of specialization as Smith for 
highlighting the gains form trade. According to this rule — called here the classical rule of 
specialization — it is beneficial for a country to import commodities whenever they can be 
obtained in exchange for exports whose production entails less real cost compared to the 
home-production of the same amount of the imported commodities. This rule is at the very 
core of Smith’s productivity theory of trade. 
The accurate interpretation of the numerical example also puts into question the 
familiar contraposition between Ricardo’s comparative advantage and the “Smith’s” absolute 
cost advantage theory of trade. Smith should not be considered as an advocate of the later. 
The passages of the Wealth of Nations that have been quoted to prove his adherence to this 
theory are actually about the classical rule of specialization. Since the comparative-advantage 
proposition is basically an implication of this rule, it should be considered as a valuable 
addition rather than a point of disruption with respect to Smith’s international trade theory. 
Bibliography 
Bloomfield, A. I. (1989). Aspects of the Theory of International Trade in France: 1800-1914. 
Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, 41 (3), 619-639. 
Buchanan, J. M., & Yoon, Y. J. (2002). Globalization as Framed by the Two Logics of Trade. 
The Independent Review , 6 (3), 399-405. 
Kibritçioglu, A. (2002). On the Smithian Origins of "New" Trade and Growth Theories. 
Economics Bulletin , 2 (1), 1-15. 
Smith’s and Ricardo’s Common Logic of Trade Jorge Morales Meoqui 
 19 
MacLeod, C. (1983). Henry Martin and the Authorship of "Considerations upon the East 
India Trade". Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research , 56, 222-229. 
Martyn, H. (1701). Considerations on the East-India Trade. In J. R. McCulloch (Ed.), A Select 
Collection of Early English Tracts on Commerce (Vol. I, pp. 541-629). London: Pickering & 
Chatto. 
Morales Meoqui, J. (2011). Comparative Advantage and the Labor Theory of Value 
(forthcoming). History of Political Economy. Available online at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/27099/ 
Morales Meoqui, J. (2010). Ricardo vs. Ricardian Model. MPRA Paper No. 27104. Available 
online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27104/ 
Myint, H. (1977). Adam Smith's Theory of International Trade in the Perspective of 
Economic Development. Economica , 44 (175), 231-248. 
Ricardo, D. (2004). The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo. (P. Sraffa, Ed.) Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, Inc. 
Ruffin, R. J. (2002). David Ricardo's Discovery of the Comparative Advantage. History of 
Political Economy , 34 (4), 727-748. 
Ruffin, R. J. (2005). Debunking a Myth: Torrens on Comparative Advantage. History of Political 
Economy , 37 (4), 711-722. 
Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (The Glasgow 
Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith ed., Vol. II). (R. H. 
Campbell, & A. S. Skinner, Eds.) Indianapolis: LibertyClassics. 
Sraffa, P. (1930). An Alleged Correction of Ricardo. The Quarterly Journal of Economics , 44 (3), 
539-544. 
Viner, J. (1937). Studies in the Theory of International Trade. London: Allen & Unwin.  
